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Abstract: With increasing global investment in offshore wind energy and rapid deployment of wind 
power technologies in deep water hazardous environments, the in-service inspection of wind tur-
bines and their related infrastructure plays an important role in the safe and efficient operation of 
wind farm fleets. The use of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and remotely piloted aircraft (RPA)—
commonly known as “drones”—for remote inspection of wind energy infrastructure has received a 
great deal of attention in recent years. Drones have significant potential to reduce not only the num-
ber of times that personnel will need to travel to and climb up the wind turbines, but also the amount 
of heavy lifting equipment required to carry out the dangerous inspection works. Drones can also 
shorten the duration of downtime needed to detect defects and collect diagnostic information from 
the entire wind farm. Despite all these potential benefits, the drone-based inspection technology in 
the offshore wind industry is still at an early stage of development and its reliability has yet to be 
proven. Any unforeseen failure of the drone system during its mission may cause an interruption 
in inspection operations, and thereby, significant reduction in the electricity generated by wind tur-
bines. In this paper, we propose a semiquantitative reliability analysis framework to identify and 
evaluate the criticality of mission failures—at both system and component levels—in inspection 
drones, with the goal of lowering the operation and maintenance (O&M) costs as well as improving 
personnel safety in offshore wind farms. Our framework is built based upon two well-established 
failure analysis methodologies, namely, fault tree analysis (FTA) and failure mode and effects anal-
ysis (FMEA). It is then tested and verified on a drone prototype, which was developed in the labor-
atory for taking aerial photography and video of both onshore and offshore wind turbines. The 
most significant failure modes and underlying root causes within the drone system are identified, 
and the effects of the failures on the system’s operation are analysed. Finally, some innovative so-
lutions are proposed on how to minimize the risks associated with mission failures in inspection 
drones. 
Keywords: unmanned aerial vehicle; drone; offshore wind; inspection; reliability; fault tree analy-
sis; failure mode and effects analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, offshore wind energy technologies have gained widespread attention 
and experienced a rapid development because of the many advantages they offer. The 
wind resources in offshore sites are more abundant, stronger, and blow more consistently 
Citation: Shafiee, M.; Zhou, Z.; Mei, 
L.; Dinmohammadi, F.; Karama, J.; 
Flynn, D. Unmanned Aerial Drones 
for Inspection of Offshore Wind  
Turbines: A Mission-Critical  
Failure Analysis. Robotics 2021, 10, 
26. https://doi.org/ 
10.3390/robotics10010026 
Received: 10 December 2020 
Accepted: 28 January 2021 
Published: 1 February 2021 
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neu-
tral with regard to jurisdictional 
claims in published maps and insti-
tutional affiliations. 
 
Copyright: © 2021 by the authors. 
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. 
This article is an open access article 
distributed under the terms and con-
ditions of the Creative Commons At-
tribution (CC BY) license (http://cre-
ativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). 
Robotics 2021, 10, 26 2 of 30 
 
 
than those on land. Additionally, wind turbines at sea are less noisy and more environ-
mentally friendly than their land-based counterparts. The Global Wind Energy Council 
(GWEC) estimates that the total offshore wind energy capacity in the world will surge to 
more than 234 gigawatts (GW) by the end of 2030 [1]. 
Significant investments have been made in recent years to deploy large-scale wind 
turbines of 9 to 12 megawatts (MW) in size, in order to achieve the best economies of scale 
in the offshore wind sector [2]. Offshore wind farm infrastructures are inherently complex 
and prone to failures. A significant expenditure is required to repair/upgrade these critical 
infrastructures when they fail. The costs associated with operation and maintenance 
(O&M) account for a large portion of the total life-cycle cost in offshore wind energy pro-
jects. According to a research conducted on a 500-MW baseline offshore wind farm (con-
sisting of 100 wind turbines of 5-MW), the O&M costs accounted for about 26% of the 
levelised cost of energy (LCoE) over the 25 years’ life of the project [3]. Therefore, reducing 
O&M time and cost has become a high priority for the offshore wind energy sector as a 
step on the road toward achieving lower LCoE values. A key strategy in this regard is 
developing new and innovative technologies that can help wind farm owners/operators 
improve their O&M practices for offshore wind farms located in geographically remote 
regions. 
Performing inspections on wind turbines during the project life cycle is a key part of 
safe and effective operation of wind energy projects. Wind turbines must be inspected and 
maintained on a regular basis to ensure they are in satisfactory condition. Traditionally, 
the inspection of wind turbines is carried out visually by experienced technicians having 
adequate knowledge in identifying the defects. However, the visual inspection of some 
components, such as tower, rotor blades, hub, and frames, is very resource intensive and 
often takes a long time to execute. It may also pose serious health and safety risks to per-
sonnel who carry out the tasks, in particular when the weather conditions are severe (e.g., 
wind is strong, or waves are high). With respect to safety, the personnel sometimes must 
climb the wind turbine tower, which is up to about 80 m high from the ground, to carry 
out some inspection works on the nacelle’s internal components. In addition, for the in-
spection of rotor components (comprising of blades and hub) the personnel will have to 
dangle by ropes from the top of wind turbines and work for some hours at high altitudes 
(sometimes over 100 m) above the sea, which can be life-threatening and even fatal. 
With the aim of reducing inspection duration and minimizing O&M costs, numerous 
robotic platforms are being deployed in the offshore wind industry to help technicians 
conduct inspections remotely and collect diagnostic information from the entire wind 
farm in real-time. Drones are a category of flying vehicles, known as unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) or remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), which are able to operate in a highly 
automated manner. According to Sundqvist [4], the term “UAV” was first used more than 
one hundred years ago, whereas the term “drone” became popular after the 1930s primar-
ily in military reconnaissance missions. In the 1970s, drones became lighter, more ad-
vanced, and more automated. Nowadays, they can fly long missions at high altitudes (up 
to 400ft above ground level) and follow a predetermined path to get close to an object and 
take pictures and videos of it without any human intervention. Drones are currently used 
in a wide range of applications, including fisheries monitoring, maritime patrol, coastline 
monitoring, drug traffic monitoring, high-accuracy terrain mapping, crop and harvest 
monitoring, road traffic monitoring and control, law enforcement, forest fire detection, 
high voltage power line monitoring, etc. (for further see [5]). Santos et al. [6] described 
how the maintenance of power lines could be performed with the help of drones. Jordan 
et al. [7] also explained how to use drones for the inspection of sewers, railways, etc. 
Drones are becoming increasingly popular technologies in the offshore wind energy 
sector for remote inspection of wind turbines as well as transportation of spare parts to 
offshore sites. Høglund [8] described how drones can help wind farm operators gather 
information from their wind turbine fleets. Frederiksen and Knudsen [9] discussed about 
the opportunities and barriers to deploying a drone-based inspection technology in 
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offshore wind farms. Stout and Thompson [10] presented a five-stage process for visual 
inspection using drones in offshore wind farms. These stages include creation of defect 
standard, collection of data, image processing, development of criticality matrix, and vis-
ualisation of outputs. For the inspection of offshore wind turbines, the drones are often 
transported in a vessel (e.g., a boat or a helicopter) to the offshore wind farm and then 
they are flied to the top of wind turbines via a remote control. Drones have the capability 
to hover in one place and take high-quality images of wind turbine components from dif-
ferent positions and angles (see Figure 1). These images can then be analysed by a com-
puter to identify early signs of defects in or damage to wind turbines and identify appro-
priate maintenance actions to prevent failure modes from occurring. Some high-resolution 
cameras may be required for this purpose. A wide variety of sensors including visual and 
thermal, infrared, near infrared (NIR), hyperspectral, etc., might also be fitted on drones 
to capture different types of data. Galleguillos et al. [11] demonstrated how defects in 
wind turbine composite blades can be detected using a drone equipped with an infrared 
thermographic camera. Shivaram [12] demonstrated how to use images taken by a quad-
copter drone to accurately detect any damage, cracks, or structural deformation in wind 
turbine blades. Zhang et al. [13] discussed how to use a photogrammetric software to de-
tect wind turbine blade defects from the aerial photographs taken by a drone. 
 
Figure 1. Robotic platforms for the inspection of offshore wind farms. 
The use of drones has significant potential to increase efficiency, reduce O&M costs, 
improve operational safety as well as minimize production downtimes in the wind energy 
sector. However, despite all these potential benefits, the drone-based inspection technol-
ogy for offshore wind turbines is still at an early stage of development and further studies 
are necessary to identify key technological gaps, opportunities, and future requirements 
of the technology in terms of hardware, software, and data [14,15]. Reliability, which is 
defined as the probability of a system functioning without failure for a given period of 
time in a designed environment, is a key performance indicator for drone systems. Ensur-
ing the reliability of drones when they are in mission mode is a challenging issue [16–18]. 
Any unforeseen failure of a drone system during its flight may cause an interruption in 
inspection operations, and thereby, significant reduction in the electricity generated by 
wind turbines. The failure rate of drones is reported at about 1 in 1000 flight hours, which 
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is about 100 times greater than that of commercial aviation [19,20]. To identify, analyse, 
and mitigate the risks as well as lower the maintenance costs associated with failure of 
drones in offshore wind farms, it is necessary to develop methodologies that are capable 
of determining the drone’s reliability at both system and component levels. In an effort to 
address this research gap, our paper presents a semiquantitative analysis framework—
based on two well-established reliability methodologies, namely fault tree analysis (FTA) 
and failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)—to determine the criticality of mission fail-
ures occurring in a drone-based inspection technology. A drone prototype is designed in 
the laboratory for taking aerial photography and video of both onshore and offshore wind 
turbines. Our drone consists of four key subsystems of communication, sensor, propul-
sion, and frame, as well as several components such as flight controller, transmitter and 
receiver, motors, electronic speed control (ESC), propellers, battery, camera, etc. By means 
of an FTA approach, the failure modes of each subsystem and component as well as the 
underlying causes of each failure mode are identified and their resulting effects on the 
system’s operation are analysed. To assess the occurrence, severity, and detectability of 
mission failures, the generic 1 to 10 ratings scale used in the traditional FMEA technique 
is justified by consulting with drone design and manufacturing companies as well as off-
shore inspection service providers. Finally, the components are ranked by their risk pri-
ority and some innovative solutions are proposed on how to minimize the risks associated 
with mission failures in the drone system. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is 
the first study implementing the FTA and FMEA methodologies on an unmanned aerial 
drone designed to collect inspection data from offshore wind farms. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview 
of inspection works being conducted in offshore wind farms and reviews the state-of-the-
art of drone technologies and their working procedures. Section 3 explains the reliability 
analysis framework in a step-by-step manner. The proposed framework is tested and ver-
ified on a drone prototype, which was developed in the laboratory for the inspection of 
wind turbines, and the results of the analysis are presented in Section 4. Finally, the paper 
is concluded with possible future direction in Section 5. 
2. Research Background 
2.1. Review of Inspection Activities in Offshore Wind Farms 
This section provides an overview of the inspection works being performed and the 
inspection methods being adopted in the offshore wind industry. Currently, the inspec-
tion tasks in offshore wind farms are carried out at times when the weather condition is 
good and the sea state is calm. These tasks have been traditionally performed in two ways, 
either using “rope-access” or a “ground-camera”. Rope-access inspection involves two or 
more personnel climbing to the top of a wind turbine and abseiling down each blade using 
ropes or elevated platforms to identify and capture the defects. The problem with this 
method is the risk of falling into the sea. In the ground-based inspection, a camera stands 
on a boat about 70–80 m away from the wind turbine to take pictures of the components. 
Then, the pictures are stitched together to create one complete image that technicians can 
zoom in on all the way down to obtain defect information. 
The method and frequency of inspections can significantly affect the likelihood of 
unexpected failures as well as the costs associated with repair operations in offshore wind 
farms. The traditional methods of inspection in offshore wind farms are visual and the 
data being collected are not consistent in quality. However, recent inspection methods 
include nondestructive testing (NDT) techniques (e.g., ultrasonic and thermography), 
which provide detailed information about the defects, such as the location of each zone of 
damage, its thickness and size, etc. The most common NDT methods with their ad-
vantages and disadvantages for the inspection of offshore wind turbines are presented in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1. The most common nondestructive testing (NDT) methods for the inspection of offshore wind turbines [21]. 
NDT Advantages Disadvantage 
Ultrasonic testing (UT) 
• High sensitivity 
• Detection of surface flaws 
• Information about depth of defects 
• Reproducible flaw detection 
• Possibility of mode purity 
• Low complexity of signals 
• On-demand inspection 
• Requires extensive technical knowledge 
• Requires surface preparation 
• Difficulty in inspecting irregular shapes 
• High penetrating power 
• Time-consuming 
• Short-term field inspection 
• Supervision is needed 
• High signal attenuation 
Acoustic Emission 
(AE) 
• High sensitivity 
• High signal to noise ratio (SNR) 
• Defect localization 
• Able to detect early-stage faults 
• Passive and in-service inspection 
• Portable or highly automated operation 
• Adaptable with wireless sensor networks 
• No supervision is needed 
• Frequency range is far from load perturbation 
• Long-term field inspection 
• No need to disassemble and clean a specimen 
• Few access points are required 
• Non-repeatable event 
• Event-based 
• Very high sampling rate is required 
• No quantitative results about size and depth 
are provided 
• High signal attenuation 
Fibre optics 
• High sensitivity 
• No attenuation over long distances 
• Small size and light weight 
• High multiplexing capabilities 
• Immunity to electromagnetic interference 
• Impractical for large wind farms 
• Requires extreme care for safe installation 
• Susceptibility to physical damage 
• Thermal sensitivity 
Thermographic Testing 
(TT) 
• Large scale inspection 
• Full-coverage in short time 
• Can be used for inaccessible areas 
• Single-side access is required 
• Not any specific safety is required 
• Limited to on- or near-surface flaws 
• Manual operation and expensive 
• Difficult to use on rotating blades 
• Difficult to detect interior damage  
• Relies on regular inspections 
• Short-term field inspection 
• Supervision is needed 
Radiographic Testing 
(RT) 
• Information about depth of defects 
• Suitable for complex structures and different 
materials 
• Large scale inspection 
• Full coverage in short time 
• 2D and 3D images 
• Good contrast sensitivity 
• Manual operation and expensive 
• Double sided access is required 
• Difficult to use on rotating blades 
• Health and safety risks 
• Relies on regular inspections 
• Short-term field inspection 
• Supervision is needed 
The frequency of inspections in offshore wind farms depends on numerous factors, 
such as type of the system or component, potential failure modes and their likelihood of 
occurrence, impact of failures on the system functionality, availability of service vessels, 
accessibility to the offshore site, weather conditions, etc. The industry practice shows that 
inspections in the offshore wind industry are often conducted with two time-intervals, 
either once in a year (usually during July) or twice in a year (usually during May and 
October) [22]. Several industry codes and standards such as DNV-OS-J101 [23] have also 
been developed to determine the inspection intervals based on some percentage of re-
maining useful life (RUL) or severity of damage. 
As of 2018, the market shares for rope-access and ground-based camera inspections 
are 83% and 10%, respectively [24]. The market for drone-based inspection is projected to 
grow in the offshore wind energy sector in the coming years as the drone technology is 
becoming more affordable, faster, and easier to use. The drone-based inspection opera-
tions in offshore wind farms involve at least two personnel, one to control the drone and 
another to control the boat. The drones can capture high-quality images and videos from 
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aerial views, which can then be processed in command centres to identify where the de-
fects on wind turbines are and what type of maintenance action should be performed to 
avoid failure occurrence. Drones can detect different types of damage, such as fatigue 
cracks, surface corrosion, galvanic corrosion, pitting, stress corrosion cracking, and ero-
sion. A list of possible damage mechanisms in offshore wind turbines that can be detected 
by drones is presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Damage mechanisms of offshore wind turbine that can be detected by drones. 
Damage Mechanism Causes 
Fatigue cracking Cyclic loading 
Corrosion (uniform, localized, 
etc.) 
Exposure to corrosive materials such as mineral or carbonic acids or aqueous 
environments, seawater and humid or condensing environments 
Pitting corrosion 
A form of extremely localized corrosion that leads to the creation of small holes in the 
metal. The driving power for pitting corrosion is the depassivation of a small area, 
which becomes anodic while an unknown but potentially vast area becomes cathodic 
Corrosion fatigue Corrosion fatigue is caused by crack development under the simultaneous action of 
corrosion and cyclic stress 
Erosion It occurs due to the effect of weather conditions such as rain and hail 
Mechanical damage Extreme wind/wave loadings 
2.2. Drone Technology 
In this section, the commercial drone technologies and their working procedures are 
studied. The unmanned aerial drones can broadly be categorised into three kinds of mul-
tirotor, fixed-wing, and single-rotor helicopters. A multirotor or multicopter is a type of 
drone that consists of either three rotors (known as tricopter), four rotors (quadracopter), 
six rotors (hexacopter), or eight rotors (octocopter). The quadcopters are the most popular 
and widely used multirotor drones because they provide the best balance between lift, 
control, manoeuvrability, and cost [25]. Multirotor drones are the cheapest type of drones 
in the market; however, they require a lot of energy to operate and their endurance and 
speed are limited. With the current battery technology, multirotor drones are capable of 
flying for only around 20 to 30 min at a time while carrying a lightweight camera payload. 
A fixed-wing drone is a type of drone designed with one rigid wing like an aeroplane 
to provide the lift rather than vertical lift rotors. Fixed-wing drones only need energy to 
move forward but not to hold themselves up in the air; so, they are much more efficient 
than multirotor drones [26]. They are also able to cover long distances and map large ar-
eas. Nevertheless, their main drawbacks are high cost and inability to hover in one spot. 
Single-rotor drones have only one rotor that holds them up and a tail rotor, which controls 
their heading. They can hover with a heavy payload (e.g., an aerial LIDAR laser scanner) 
or have a mixture of hovering with long endurance or fast forward flight. However, sin-
gle-rotor drones are complex devices, and their spinning blades might be dangerous. In 
terms of difficulty to use, single-rotor drones lie somewhere between multirotors and 
fixed-wing drones. Examples of these three types of drones are shown in Figure 2. 
   
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 2. Multirotor (a), fixed-wing (b), and single-rotor (c) drones. 
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Table 3 presents a list of advantages and disadvantages of multirotor, fixed-wing, 
and single-rotor drones. 
Table 3. Advantages and disadvantages of multirotor, fixed-wing, and single-rotor drones. 
Type of Drone Advantages Disadvantages 
Multirotor 
- Low price 
- High accessibility  
- Great manoeuvrability 
- Ease of use 
- Vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) 
- Good camera control 
- Short flight times 
- Small payload capacity 
- Low stability in the wind  
Fixed-wing 
- Long endurance 
- Large area coverage 
- Fast flight speed 
- Great stability 
- Safer recovery from motor power loss 
- High price 
- Large takeoff/landing zone is required 
- No VTOL/hover 
- Challenging to fly; training is needed 
- Low efficient for area mapping 
Single-rotor 
- Long endurance  
- VTOL and hover flight 
- High payload capability 
- High price 
- Dangerous 
- Difficult to fly; training is needed 
Even though the three types of multirotor, fixed-wing, and single-rotor drones have 
different designs, their working principles are basically similar. In Figure 3, the schematic 
working principle of unmanned aerial drones is presented. The flight control system 
works as the brain of a drone. The flight control instructions are sent to the drone through 
a laptop and a remote controller, which constitute the ground control station (GCS) [27]. 
 
Figure 3. The schematic working principle of unmanned aerial drones. 
The GCS is a high-level command centre, which acts as an interface between the op-
erator and the drone. The data between laptop and remote control are synchronised via 
wireless connection technology such as Bluetooth and Wifi. The drone’s flight path is pre-
programmed on a computer or the drone is controlled using the remote controller in real-
time. The instructions are transmitted by a radio control (RC) transmitter. The gimbal can 
support the camera, and the compensation algorithm in it can compensate the vibration 
of the drone when taking pictures or recording videos. When the gimbal receives the in-
structions, the motor inside it can respond quickly to the set angle from the drone. The 
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gimbal can be controlled either on the same controller as the drone or by another control-
ler. In such case, two people can work together to control both of them or only one person 
controls it with the help of the autopilot system. Sometimes, the images captured by 
drones need to be transmitted in real time for processing. The drone returns to the set 
point in the autopilot mode when the mission is accomplished or something unpredicta-
ble such as losing the link with the GCS happens. Throughout the mission, drones can use 
radar or sonar to avoid collisions with the surrounding environment. 
3. Reliability Analysis Framework 
In this section, a reliability analysis and improvement framework based on two meth-
odologies of FTA and FMEA is proposed to determine the criticality of mission failures in 
a drone-based inspection technology for offshore wind farms. The process for applying 
the framework is presented in a step-by-step manner as follows: 
3.1. Define the Drone-Based Inspection Technology and Its Surrounding Environment 
In this step, we define the drone-based inspection technology, its primary and sec-
ondary functions, the external environment that the system is supposed to interact with, 
the system’s capability to sense its surrounding environment, the system’s interfaces with 
the asset being inspected, system’s positioning and navigation capability, etc. 
3.2. Define the Reliability Goal, System Boundary, and Operating Conditions 
In this step, the reliability goals for the design and operation of the drone system are 
established to act as a reference for further verification and validation (V&V). More so, the 
scope and boundaries of the system are defined and the operating conditions within 
which the system is intended to operate (such as wind speed and direction, temperature, 
rainfall, humidity, and pressure) will be identified. 
3.3. Collect the System Design and Functional Information 
In this step, the detailed design and functional specifications of the drone system (in-
cluding CAD drawings, material specifications, test data, fault and incident logs, etc.) are 
collected from different parties involved in the project including: designers, original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs), test engineers, operators, etc. 
3.4. Break the System into Its Sub-Systems and Components 
In this step, the architecture of the drone system—in terms of hardware (mechanical 
and electrical), sensors and software—is described. The system’s constituting elements are 
identified and a complete list of components and parts for each subsystem is prepared. 
Then, the relations between subsystems, components, and parts are defined using a de-
pendence diagram (DD) or a reliability block diagram (RBD). RBD is a diagram represent-
ing how the components/subsystems of a system are reliability-wise related (connected). 
3.5. Identify Failure Modes of the System/Components 
In this step, the mission failure modes associated with the drone system and its com-
ponents are determined. Some typical failure modes of a drone system include: “software 
is faulty at mission start”, “drone is damaged during its mission”, “drone has unexpected 
and unwanted behaviour during the mission”, “drone is dropped while being carried and 
transported in a vessel to offshore site”, “drone falls during transfer to shore”, etc. 
3.6. Identify the Root Causes of Each Failure Mode 
Every failure mode has one or more root causes. Some examples of root causes un-
derlying a mission failure in a drone system include: “wrong mission plan”, “faulty set 
up of the drone”, “internal and external damages”, “bad electrical conduction”, “poor 
maintenance”, “human error”, “bad weather conditions”, etc. To determine root causes 
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associated with failure modes, the fault tree analysis (FTA) method is used. FTA is a top-
down, deductive failure analysis method in which an undesired state of a system is ana-
lysed using Boolean logic to combine a series of lower-level events. FTA is usually repre-
sented by a logic diagram beginning with an undesired top event (which, in this case, is 
the inability of the drone to accomplish the mission) and then working backward through 
intermediate events until all possible root causes at the bottom are determined. Pathways 
are used to interconnect events that contribute to the top event and/or intermediate events 
[28]. These pathways use standard logic symbols, such as AND, OR, and others. Table 4 
defines the logic symbols commonly used in the FTA method. 
Table 4. The gate symbols used in fault tree analysis (FTA). 
Symbol Gate Name Meaning 
 
AND All the input events must occur to result 
in an output event 
 
OR Output event occurs if any one of the 
input events occurs 
 
Exclusive OR (XOR) 
Output event occurs when only one 
input event occurs 
 
m out of n gate (voting gate) Output event occurs if at least m (out of 
n) events occur 
 
Inhibit gate 
When a conditional event occurs, input 
procedures output 
 
Basic Event Failure or primary event (root cause) 
 
Top/Intermediate event 
Top event is an undesired state caused 
by events occurring within a system. An 
intermediate event is a fault event, which 
occurs from a combination of other 
events via logic gates 
 
Undeveloped event An event that could be developed 
further but does not need to be 
3.7. Determine the Rating Scale for the Occurrence of a Failure (O) 
Failure rate (λ) is the frequency with which a component fails, or a root cause leads 
to a failure. Assuming that failure times of the components follow an exponential distri-
bution, the reliability and mean time between failures (MTBF) of the system are obtained 
by Equations (1) and (2), respectively: 
R(t) = e−λt, (1) 
MTBF = 1/λ. (2) 
Based on the estimated failure rate, an occurrence rating between 1 and 10 is assigned 
to each failure mode [29]. In this study, the ratings for the occurrence of a failure (O) follow 
the scale given in BS EN IEC 60,812 [30] and are shown in Table 5. In this scale, 1 indicates 
“unlikely” failure and 10 corresponds to “almost certain” failure. 
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Table 5. Occurrence ratings (O) for a mission failure in an inspection drone system. 
Rating Occurrence Meaning λ 
1 remote Failure is unlikely ≤1/1,500,000 
2 low Relatively few failures 1/150,000 
3 - - 1/15,000 
4 moderate Occasional failures 1/2000 
5 - - 1/400 
6 - - 1/80 
7 high Repeated failures 1/20 
8 - - 1/8 
9 very high Failure is almost inevitable 1/3 
10 - - ≥1/2 
3.8. Evaluate How Each Failure Mode Affects the Performance of the Drone System, and/or the 
Asset Being Inspected and/or Health and Safety of Personnel 
Each of the possible failure modes would have an impact on the performance of the 
drone system, as well as perhaps on the wind turbine components being inspected and/or 
the health and safety of the personnel undertaking inspections. The impacts of a failure 
on the drone system may include: “loss of system”, “severe damage to the system”, “mi-
nor damage to the system”, “mission abort”, etc. The impacts of a drone failure on the 
asset may include: “loss of wind turbine”, “severe damage to the wind turbine”, “loss of 
electricity production”, etc. The impacts of a failure on human operators include: “loss of 
life”, “severe injury”, “minor damage to health”, etc. 
3.9. Determine the Rating Scale for the Severity of a Failure (S) 
Based on the impacts of a failure on the drone system and/or the wind turbine asset 
and/or the health and safety of personnel, a severity rating based on a 10-point scale is 
assigned to each failure mode [31]. In this study, the ratings for the severity of a failure (S) 
follow the scale given in BS EN IEC 60,812 [30]. As shown in Table 6, the severity ratings 
vary from 1 to 10, where 1 represents “no effect” and 10 corresponds to “loss of life”. 
Table 6. Severity ratings (S) for a mission failure in an inspection drone system. 
Rating Severity Effect Meaning 
1 none No effect 
2 very minor Minor damage to autonomous inspection system 
3 minor Minor damage to the asset being inspected 
4 very low Minor damage to health and safety of the operators 
5 low Major damage to autonomous inspection system 
6 moderate Major damage to the asset being inspected 
7 high Sever injury 
8 very high Loss of autonomous inspection system 
9 hazardous with warning Loss of asset 
10 hazardous without warning Loss of life 
3.10. Identify the Current Control Measures to Detect or Prevent a Given Cause of Failure, and 
Determine the Detectability Rating (D) 
In this step, the current controls that may detect a failure mode or effect of a failure 
are identified and then a detectability rating from 1 to 10 is assigned. The detectability 
rating represents how likely a failure or the effect of a failure can be detected. If there is 
no current control, the likelihood of detection will be very low and therefore the item will 
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receive a high ranking such as 9 or 10. In this study, the ratings for detectability of a failure 
(D) follow the scale given in BS EN IEC 60,812 [30]. This scale is presented in Table 7. 
Table 7. Rating scales for the detection of a failure (D). 
Rating Detection Meaning 
1 almost certain Design control will almost certainly detect a potential cause and 
subsequent failure mode. 
2 very high Very high chance the design control will detect a potential 
cause and subsequent failure mode. 
3 high High chance the design control will detect a potential cause and 
subsequent failure mode. 
4 moderately high Moderately high chance the design control will detect a 
potential cause and subsequent failure mode. 
5 moderate Moderate chance the design control will detect a potential cause 
and subsequent failure mode. 
6 low Low chance the design control will detect a potential cause and 
subsequent failure mode. 
7 very low Very low chance the design control will detect a potential cause 
and subsequent failure mode. 
8 remote Remote chance the design control will detect a potential cause 
and subsequent failure mode. 
9 very remote Very remote chance the design control will detect a potential 




Design control will not and/or cannot detect a potential cause 
and subsequent failure mode; or there is no design control. 
3.11. Calculate the Risk-Priority-Number (RPN) 
RPN is calculated by multiplying the occurrence ranking times the severity ranking 
times the detectability ranking for each failure mode [31], i.e., 
RPN = O × S × D. (3) 
Since the scales used for O, S, and D range from 1 to 10, the RPN values will be be-
tween 1 and 1000. The total RPN of each component is calculated by adding the RPNs of 
all individuated failure modes. 
3.12. Prioritize the Failure Modes for Action 
The failure modes are prioritized in descending order according to their RPN values. 
Failure modes with large RPN values are given a higher priority for risk mitigation efforts 
in comparison to those having low RPN values. A Pareto analysis can be used to visualize 
the differences between the rankings for the failures and effects. The Pareto analysis 
means that 20 percent of the potential failures and effects account for 80 percent of the 
total RPN [31]. 
3.13. Develop Corrective or Preventive Actions to Improve the System Reliability 
In this step, corrective or preventive actions are proposed to eliminate or reduce the 
high-risk failure modes. Often, the easiest approach for improving the reliability is to in-
crease the detectability of failures, thus, lowering the detection rating (D). Reducing the 
severity rating (S) is also important, especially in situations where failures may lead to 
loss of asset or injuries to personnel. However, the richest opportunity for improvement 
lies in reducing the likelihood of failure (O). In Table 8, a list of suggestions on how to 
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prevent occurrence, reduce severity, and improve detectability of mission failures in the 
drone system are given. 
Table 8. Strategies to reduce the risk of mission failures in a drone system. 
Strategy Suggested Solutions 
Prevent occurrence  
 Burn-in the components before assembling them into the drone; 
 Improve design and material performances of the drone 
components; 
 Software testing; 
 Addressing multiple root causes; 
 Regular preventive maintenance (PM) for drone components; 
 Planned replacement of the components before they wear out; 
 Error-proofing.  
Reduce severity  
 Adding redundancy or backup systems; 
 “Fail-safe” sysems; 
 Expanding supplier base, multiple sources; 
 Personnel awarness and training. 
Improve 
detectability 
 Automated fault detection and early warning systems; 
 Building-in special sensors to monitor the drone’s performance; 
 Better measuring devices, calibration checks; 
 Verification 
3.14. Prepare FMEA Report by Summarizing the Analysis in a Tabular Form 
In this step, the FMEA results are summarized in a tabular form as shown in Table 9. 
The following columns are included in the FMEA worksheet to record data regarding the 
system: 
- Component (column 1); 
- Potential failure mode (column 2); 
- Potential effects of failure mode (column 3); 
- Possible root causes (column 4); 
- Present control mechanisms (method of detection) (column 5); 
- Severity, occurrence, and detection ratings (columns 6–8); 
- Risk Priority Number (RPN) (column 9); 
- Recommend actions (column 10) 
- Action taken (column 11); 
- Revised severity, occurrence, and detection ratings (columns 12–14); 
- Revised RPN (column 15). 









FMEA Date (org.) 

































Robotics 2021, 10, 26 13 of 30 
 
 
4. Case Study 
In this section, the proposed methodologies are tested and verified on a drone proto-
type, which was developed in the laboratory. To develop our drone prototype, several 
performance and operational criteria were considered. An important parameter in this 
regard was the hovering ability because the drones must be able to hover in one position 
when taking pictures from the wind turbine surface. The precision of the positioning sys-
tem was another important consideration. The other criteria we considered were the ease 
of integration and compatibility with thermal camera, system’s reliability, operating tem-
perature, thermal properties, vision parameters, battery life, wind resistance, hovering ac-
curacy, payload, and the price [32–34]. Table 10 presents the list of criteria and their re-
quirements that we considered when developing the drone prototype for inspecting off-
shore wind turbines. 
Table 10. The criteria and the requirements for an offshore wind turbine inspection drone. 
Number Criterion Requirement 
1 Compatible with thermal 
camera 
Yes 
2 Drone reliability As high as possible 
3 Operating temperature Working temperature between 0 °C and 
40 °C 
4 Thermal parameters As high as possible 
5 Vision parameters As high as possible 
6 Battery life As long as possible 
7 Wind resistance As high as possible 
8 Hovering accuracy As low as possible 
9 Payload As high as possible 
10 Price As low as possible 
Our drone prototype consists of four subsystems and several components and parts 
enabling it to move forward, rotate the camera, and take pictures of an object. These four 
subsystems with their constituting components and parts are defined below and shown 
in Figure 4. 
(i) airframe system—fuselage, wings, landing gear, etc. 
(ii) propulsion system—motor, battery, electronic speed control (ESC), propeller, etc. 
(iii) sensors—LIDAR, infrared and thermal cameras, multispectral sensors, 
magnetometer sensors, image sensors, etc. 
(iv) communication system—remote controller, flight controller, ground control station 
(GCS), first person view (FPV) goggles, radio control (RC) transmitter/receiver, etc. 
A fault tree diagram is drawn using PTC Windchill Risk and Reliability (formerly 
known as Relex) to identify contributing factors to failure of the drone system. As shown 
in Figure 5, the diagram contains four input events (including communication subsystem 
failure, sensor subsystem failure, propulsion subsystem failure, and frame subsystem fail-
ure), which are connected with an OR gate to the top event (drone mission failure). 




Figure 4. Subsystems and components of our drone prototype for inspecting wind turbines. 
 
Figure 5. A fault-tree diagram of a drone prototype system. 
Each of the subsystems itself consists of a series of components and parts interacting 
with each other. Our analysis focused on those components experiencing more frequent 
failures and higher maintenance costs. These components included: flight controller, RC 
transmitter/receiver, antenna, FPV goggles, radio telemetry, motors, ESC, propellers, 
charger, battery, frame, camera, gimbal, and GPS. The main functions of these compo-
nents are described in Table 11. 
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Table 11. The function(s) of the drone’s components. 
Subsystem Component Function 
Communication 
Flight controller 
It converts the inputs that the pilot makes on the controller sticks into 
signals that the motor can understand. Flight controller can be linked up 
to software in order to customize drone properties and influence how 
they respond to specific inputs detected by the gyroscope [4]. 
RC 
transmitter/receiver 
The transmitter translates radio signals from a remote controller to the 
actual movement of the drone’s rotors. The receiver collects the data sent 
from the transmitter and relays the information to the flight controller 
[35]. 
Antenna It broadcasts the signal from the video transmitter and is tuned to a 
particular radio frequency for first person view (FPV) racing drones. 
FPV goggles 
The video transmitter sends a signal that is picked up by the antenna on 
the FPV goggles. Then, the video receiver on the FPV goggles displays 
this on the screen, giving the pilot an immersive sensation. 
Radio telemetry It is a wireless system for two way communication between the drone’s 
control system and ground control station (GCS) [4]. 
Propulsion 
Motors The motors are mounted to the arms of the frame to provide power to 
the propellers [36]. 
Electronic Speed 
Controller (ESC) 
It interprets the electrical signal generated by the flight controller and 
provides the appropriate current to each motor to produce thrust [4]. 
Propellers Propellers are spun at high speeds by the motors to generate thrust and 
allow the drone to fly stably and properly. 
Charger It is used to charge the drone’s battery at a variety of different voltages. 
Battery It provides electricity to the drone [36]. 
Airframe Frame 
Frame is the main structure of the drone where the other components are 
mounted onto [36]. 
Sensors 
Camera  It takes photos and records videos in fly times [4]. 
Gimbal The camera moves around the gimbal for a better shoot altitude, rather 
than having to rotate the whole drone [4]. 
Global Positioning 
System (GPS) 
It provides the location information about the drone to calculate the 
distance between the real-time and the mission of the drone [4]. 
The specifications of the drone components are presented below in details: 
- Flight controller 
When choosing a microprocessor system for our drone prototype, the following cri-
teria were considered: 
• Large computing power; 
• The possibility of implementing the system without purchasing any additional 
I/O modules and support for common data transfer interfaces; 
• Programming using the graphic language LabVIEW; 
• Support for multiple flight modes; 
• Built-in gyroscope and accelerometer. 
Based on consultation with drone professionals, DJI NAZA N3 flight controller was 
chosen as it can be powered by a wide range of voltages, from 3S to 12S batteries. The 
weight of the entire kit is only 132 g, and it has a high hovering accuracy: vertical: ±0.5 m 
and horizontal: ±1.5 m. In addition to radio-controlled remote piloting, the flight control-
ler allows automatic control of a pre-established route and also has the ability to transmit 
telemetry data from a board to a ground station (telephone, tablet, laptop, DIY) (for more 
see [37]). 
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- Transmitter and receiver 
When choosing a control panel for our drone prototype, the following criteria were 
considered: 
• Data transmission distance; 
• The possibility of feedback; 
• Support for existing data transfer protocols; 
• Support for “failsafe” mode. 
Futaba 10JH perfectly fitted our purpose for an offshore wind farm inspection drone. 
It is a 2-stick, 10 channel, T-FHSS Air-2.4 GHz system with six programmable mixes, te-
lemetry, and assignable switch/lever/functions. It is also fully programmable and has a 
Futaba Advanced Spread Spectrum Technology (FASST) protocol, which allows the drone 
to fly even in noisy radio conditions. It has one variable knob, five 2-position switches, 
two 3-position switches, one momentary switch, and two digital levers, as well as built-in 
S.Bus programming link for S.Bus servos. The equipment has a “failsafe” mode, which 
allows sending a command to the flight controller that the connection with the transmitter 
has disappeared, and, therefore, it is necessary for the drone to return to its take-off point. 
The drone will receive the last command transmitted before the loss of communication. 
This mode is called “hold”. 
The specifications of the transmitter and receiver are given in Tables 12 and 13, re-
spectively (for more see [38]). 
Table 12. Transmitter’s specifications. 
Item Parameter 
Transmitter Frequency 2.4 GHz band 
System T-FHSS Air, S-FHSS, switchable 
Power Supply 6.0 V dry battery 
Table 13. Receiver’s specifications. 
Type T-FHSS Air-2.4 GHz, Dual Antenna Diversity, SBus 
System 
Power Requirement 4.8–7.4 V battery or regulated output from ESC 
Size 0.98 × 1.86 × 0.56” (24.9 × 47.3 × 14.3 mm) 
Weight 0.36oz (10.1 g) 
Battery F/S Voltage Sets up with transmitter 
Figure 6 represents a fault tree diagram drawn for the drone’s communication sub-
system. As can be seen, the top event (communication subsystem failure) contains three 
input events, namely, GCS failure, receiver failure, and controller failure, which are re-
lated with an OR gate to the top event. The receiver failure event itself contains two input 
events: controller antenna failure and payload antenna failure. 




Figure 6. A fault-tree diagram of the drone’s communication subsystem. 
- Motors 
When choosing a motor for our drone prototype, the following criteria were consid-
ered: 
• High resource; 
• High thrust-to-weight ratio (TWR); 
• Work on a direct current. 
Based on consultation with drone professionals, the Foxtech Brushless Motor X5010 
KV288 was chosen. It is CNC processed, well-balanced, and highly efficient. Maximum 
thrust of the motor can reach 3.5 kg, so it can be used in drones for aerial photography 
and videography. The specifications of the motor are given in Table 14. 
Table 14. Motor’s specifications [39]. 
Item Parameter 
KV 288 
Number of cells (Lipo) 6 S 
Weight 213 g 
Motor dimension (Diameter×Length) Φ58 mm × 34 mm 
Configuration 12N14P 
- Electronic speed controller (ESC) 
When choosing an ESC for our drone prototype, the following criteria were consid-
ered: 
• Low cost; 
• High reliability; 
• Input voltage within 11.1–22.2 V; 
• Weight of speed regulators; 
• The size of the speed controllers. 
Platinum PRO V4 40A was chosen as it has good protection against overheating. All 
components are located on both sides in such a way that they directly come in contact 
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with the aluminium case and are cooled. A 32-bit processor allows operators to fine-tune 
the smoothness of the gas. In addition, this speed controller has a battery elimination cir-
cuit (BEC) that is built in and adjustable from 5 V to 8 V (with 0.1 V increments). The 
metal–oxide–semiconductor field-effect transistor (MOSFET) of this device are made us-
ing the latest technologies and high-quality materials. ESC has protection against sparks 
when connecting the device to the power supply, which allows extending the service life 
of connectors. The specifications of the Platinum PRO V4 40A are given in Table 15. 
Table 15. ESC’s specifications [40]. 
Item Parameter 
Built-in battery elimination 
circuit (BEC) 
Yes; Switch mode: 5 V–8 V, 7A 
Continuous current 40A 
Cell count 3–6 S 
Programming 
LCD program box, WiFi module, via separate 
program port 
Peak current 60A 
Weight 47 g 
Dimensions 48 × 30 × 15.5 mm 
Spark-proof Yes 
- Propellers 
When selecting the drone’s propellers, the following criteria were considered: 
• High strength; 
• Maximum balancing; 
• Size of 18 inches. 
The 1855MKII full carbon fibre propeller was chosen for our drone prototype system. 
The specifications of this propeller are given in Table 16. 
Table 16. Propeller’s specifications [41]. 
Item Parameter 
Material Carbon fibre 
Size 18 × 5.5 inch 
Coating High gloss 3K twill finish 
Weight (each) 35 g 
- Charger 
When choosing a charger for our drone prototype system, the following criteria were 
considered: 
• High power; 
• Availability from two to four charging channels; 
• Store charging support; 
• Support 6S LiPo. 
The Turnigy Reaktor QuadKore 1200 W 80 A (4 × 300 W 20A) balance charger was 
chosen. A feature of this charger is the ability to process up to four batteries simultane-
ously. The advantage is that the charger can deliver high output power (1200 W) in a 
compact package thanks to its innovative synchronous buck-boost converter technology. 
It can provide up to 20 A on any of four charging channels. The Reaktor QuadKore also 
features storage charging, cyclic charging/discharging, 10 charge parameter memory and 
a high power balance function, which allow to prolong the life of the battery and keep it 
in top condition. The specifications of the charger are given in Table 17. 
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Table 17. Charger’s specifications [42]. 
Item Parameter 
Input voltage 10~28 V DC 
Charge current 0.1~20 A 
Discharge current 0.05~20 A 
Maximum charge capacity 1200 W (4 × 300 W) 
Maximum discharge capacity 80 W (4 × 20 W) when used without regenerative 
function 
Maximum power capacity 1200 W (4 × 300 W) 
Current drain for balancing 350 mAh/cell 
Lithium (LiPoly/LiIo/LiFe) cell 
count 1~6 series 
NiCd/NiMH cell 1~17 series 
Pb battery voltage 2~24 V 
Battery memory 10 
Log file storage 16 Mb (36 h) 
Intelligent temperature control Yes 
Dimensions 275 × 1700 × 60 mm 
Weight 1560 g 
- Battery 
The criteria considered when selecting a battery for our drone prototype include: 
• Low weight; 
• Large capacity; 
• The output voltage is 22.2 V; 
• Time-tested brand. 
Based on consultation with drone professionals, the Turnigy High Capacity 10,000 
mAh 6S 12C Lipo Pack w/XT90 was chosen. It is a high capacity LiPo battery, which is 
commonly used in multirotor applications. It has higher density compared to other bat-
teries on the market; therefore, it allows to get more capacity with the same battery di-
mensions and lower weight. It provides approximately 20 percent longer flight time com-
pared to standard LiPo batteries. The specifications of the battery are given in Table 18. 
Table 18. Battery’s specifications [43]. 
Item Parameter 
Minimum capacity 10,000 mah 
Configuration 6S2P/22.2V/6 Cell 
Constant discharge 12C 
Peak discharge (10sec) 24C 
Pack weight 1320 g 
Figure 7 represents a fault tree diagram drawn for the drone’s propulsion subsystem. 
As can be seen, the top event (propulsion subsystem failure) contains four input events, 
namely, propeller failure, ESC failure, motor failure, and battery failure, which are related 
with an OR gate to the top event. 




Figure 7. A fault-tree diagram of the drone’s propulsion subsystem. 
- Camera 




• Thermal imaging capability; 
• Stabilization mechanism. 
After consulting with inspection service providers about the types of NDT tasks be-
ing performed on wind turbines, we chose the DJI’s ZENMUSE Z30 thermal camera for 
our drone prototype system. It is the most powerful integrated aerial zoom camera avail-
able on the market with 30x optical and 6x digital zoom. The specifications of the camera 
are given in Table 19. 
Table 19. Camera’s specifications [44]. 
Item Parameter 
Dimension 152 × 137 × 61 mm 
Weight 556 g 
Sensor CMOS, 1/2.8” 
Effective Pixels: 2.13 M 
Lens 
30x Optical Zoom 
F1.6 (Wide)–F4.7 (Tele) 
Zoom Movement Speed: 
- Optical Wide–Optical Tele: 4.6 s  
- Optical Wide–Digital Tele: 6.4 s  
- Digital Wide–Digital Tele: 1.8 s 
Focus Movement Time:  
∞-near: 1.1 s 
FOV 63.7°(Wide)-2.3° (Tele) 
Digital zoom 6x 
Min working distance 10 mm–1200 mm 
Figure 8 represents a fault tree diagram drawn for the drone’s sensor subsystem. As 
can be seen, the top event (sensor subsystem failure) contains four input events, namely, 
camera failure, gimbal failure, acquisition sensor failure, and autopilot failure, which are 
related to an OR gate to the top event. 




Figure 8. Fault-tree diagram of the drone’s sensor subsystem. 
- Frame 
When choosing the drone’s frame, the following criteria were considered: 
• High strength; 
• High load capacity; 
• A light weight; 
• Folding design for compact transportation; 
• Wheelbase 800–1000 mm. 
We have chosen the frame of Tarot T960 folding hexacopter for our drone prototype 
system. This frame is made of toray carbon fiber 3K woven of pure, high temperature, and 
pressure prefabricated full CNC precision machining. The light folding system makes the 
transport of the drone easy and convenient. Screw technology has excellent resistance to 
lateral vibration. Fully carbon nanotubes have excellent damping. The frame is able to 
hold up to 15 kg. The specifications of the Tarot T960 CF folding hexacopter frame are 
given in Table 20. 
Table 20. Frame’s specifications for Tarot T960 CF folding hexacopter [45]. 
 
Item Parameter 
Weight 1050 g 
Tube diameter 25 mm 
Rack diameter 1000 mm 
Centre cover size 210 × 210 × 2.0 mm  
Motor mounting pitch 16 mm/19 mm/25 mm/27 
mm 
Wheelbase 960 mm 
Figure 9 represents a fault tree diagram drawn for the drone’s frame subsystem. As 
can be seen, the top event (frame subsystem failure) contains three input events, namely, 
arm break, landing gear failure, and main chassis break, which are related with an OR 
gate to the top event. 




Figure 9. Fault-tree diagram of the drone’s frame subsystem. 
After identifying the failure modes and their underlying causes, a Delphi technique 
was used to elicit the experts’ opinions on the ratings of three risk factors, namely, the 
occurrence of a failure (O), severity of a failure (S), and detectability of a failure (D) in the 
drone prototype. As a result, an FMEA assessment team was set up to undertake a full 
evaluation of risks associated with mission failures occurring in the drone prototype. The 
assessment team included an academic researcher who has published several articles on 
engineering failure analysis, two designers from a drone design company, three techni-
cians from a drone manufacturing company, and two maintenance engineers from an off-
shore wind maintenance service provider. All the experts were surveyed through a closed 
ended questionnaire in multiple rounds until a consensus is reached about the ratings of 
risk factors. In the first round, the experts were asked to provide their initial assessments 
of O, S, and D ratings for each failure mode. In the next round, everyone was given an 
opportunity to revise their assessments based on the anonymous and aggregated re-
sponses to the first round. This process continues until the FMEA ratings and thereby RPN 
values for each failure mode converge. 
Table 21 presents the results of the FMEA analysis conducted on the drone prototype 
in a worksheet format. As can be seen, the RPN values for the drone system components 
vary from 36 (in manual controller) to 312 (in battery). The total RPN value for the system 
is reported as 2402, which was calculated by summing up the RPN values for all failure 
modes of the drone components. The results show that eight components of battery, motor 
(rotor), propeller (blades), GPS antenna, camera, arm, controller antenna, and Inertial 
measurement unit (IMU) account for over 70 percent of the total RPN value, and, thus, 
these are considered to be the highest risk elements in the drone prototype system. 
The drone components are ranked in descending order of criticality by their risk pri-
ority and the results are shown in Figure 10. The most critical component of the drone is 
found to be the battery; therefore, it is suggested to replace the battery after each inspec-
tion mission. Moreover, adding a backup battery can significantly enhance the perfor-
mance of the drone system during mission execution. Motor is identified as the second 
most critical component of the drone system. To mitigate the risk of motor failure, it is 
suggested to replace the motor every 100 h of operation, so as to solve the problem of wear 
and fatigue. Another solution might be using a hexacopter, which can fly with even two 
damaged motors. 
For GPS antenna and IMU, the component redundancy is suggested as a means of 
increasing reliability and maintainability of the drone system. Redundancy ensures that 
if one component fails, there is at least one other component that can still deliver the 
needed performance. However, it should also be noted that the hardware redundancy is 
drones is often subject to numerous technical and legal constraints and uncertainties. The 
major problems encountered with redundancy in drones are the additional maintenance 
cost as well as space, weight, and power [46]. In order to determine what level of redun-
dancy will be most efficient for an inspection drone deployed in the offshore wind sector, 
some trade-offs must be applied. 
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To avoid the recurrence of failures in other components of the drone, it is recom-
mended to plan and carry out PM actions in a cost-effective and timely manner. 
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Table 21. FMEA results for the drone prototype system in offshore wind farms. 
Item / Function Potential Failure Mode(s) 





















































Ground control  
station (GCS) 
Loss of signal/ data delay 
Unable to analyse the 
defects 
8 Power failure 1 
Backup power 
for the ground 
station 
9 72 - - - - - - 
Manual Controller 
(Based on the 
ground) 
Unable to control manually 
Unable to control 
when there is a path 
error 
4 Poor design 1 - 9 36 - - - - - - 
Payload antenna 
Unable to detect the payload 
data  
Instability of the drone 6 Manufacturing/environmental factor 2 - 9 108 - - - - - - 
Controller antenna 
Unable to transport data (te-
lemetry data) 
Unable to receive any 
data 
7 Poor design/manufacturing/environmental factor 2 - 9 126 - - - - - - 
Acquisition Sensor 
Unable to detect the distance 
from objects 
Damage to the blades 8 Poor design/manufacturing/environmental factor 1 
Auto-pilot detec-
tion 
8 64 - - - - - - 
X-axis/Y-axis/Z-
axis servo 
Unable to move/ break Blur images 8 Poor design/manufacturing/environmental factor 2 - 6 96 - - - - - - 
Camera 





2 50 - - - - - - 
Overheating No video/image 5 High ambient temperature 4 - 5 100 - -     
IMU 
Unable to provide the real-time 
recognition of positional atti-
tude 
Unable to process the 
status of the UAV 





9 1 6 54 
GPS Antenna 
Unable to receive the accurate 
time and location data from 
GPS 
Unable to locate the 
UAV 
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8 2 3 48 
Propeller (blades) Fracture 
Unable to support the 
payload of the UAV 
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8 Manufacturing/collision with obstacle 3   5 120 
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ESC (Electronic 
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affect the battery life-
time 
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Unable to supply the 
power for the UAV 
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8 2 3 48 
Lack of power-Battery low Unable to supply the 
power for the UAV 











8 2 6 96 
Arm Fracture/crack Damage the whole 
UAV 
8 Manufacturing/environmental factor 3 - 6 144 Physical 
safety check 
- 8 2 6 96 
Landing gear Fracture/crack 
Unable to land/may 
break the compo-
nent(s) when landed 
5 Manufacturing/environmental factor 3 - 3 45 - - - - - - 
Main chassis (the 
protection frame) Fracture/crack 
Expose the chips out-
side might damage the 
chips 
3 Manufacturing/environmental factor 3 - 5 45 - - - - - - 
 




Figure 10. Risk-priority-number (RPN) values for the drone system components. 
5. Conclusions and Future Works 
With increasing the installed capacity of offshore wind power in the world, a signif-
icant research and development effort is carried out to reduce the levelised cost of energy 
(LCoE) so as to make offshore wind more competitive and attractive to investors. The 
operation and maintenance (O&M) accounts for a large portion of the total life-cycle cost 
and is the longest phase of development in offshore wind energy projects. Thus, reducing 
O&M time and cost has been of the highest priority to operators, manufacturers, and in-
surance companies in the offshore wind sector. According to some recent studies, the high 
O&M expenditure in offshore wind farms is mainly due to restricted accessibility to wind 
turbines infrastructure for inspection and maintenance. To overcome the accessibility bar-
riers, the use of remotely controlled technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV)—commonly known as drones—has received a great deal of attention in the off-
shore wind industry in recent years. 
The drone-based inspection has several advantages over the traditional methods of 
rope-access inspection and ground-based camera inspection. The use of drones leads to 
reduced number of personnel having to travel to and climb up the wind installations by 
means of crew transfer vessels (CTV) or helicopters—and all the emissions linked to that. 
Another advantage is that drones can reduce the need for heavy lifting equipment to carry 
out inspection tasks. The inspection drones are often equipped with a powerful digital 
camera capable of capturing high-resolution aerial images from the tower, nacelle, rotor 
blades, and bolt jointing. These images can be analysed via machine learning techniques 
to detect early signs of degradation and identify appropriate maintenance actions to pre-
vent failure modes from occurring. Therefore, the drones can shorten the time required in 
the field to detect faults and collect diagnostic information from all wind turbines. 
Despite all the potential benefits, the drone technology for the inspection of offshore 
wind infrastructure is still in infancy stage and there is some way to go before the tech-
nology can be fully regulated and widely used. Reliability, availability, and maintainabil-
ity (RAM) is considered as an important factor in the certification and deployment of in-
spection drone systems. However, after reviewing the literature, no RAM study was 
found that attempted to quantify the risks associated with the failure of inspection drones 
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in offshore wind farms. The failure of any single element, component, or subsystem of a 
drone system during its mission may lead to catastrophic or hazardous conditions such 
as loss of wind turbine, loss of electricity production, serious injuries, and even loss of life. 
Therefore, it is necessary to develop methodologies that are capable of assessing the 
drone’s RAM—at both system and component levels—in uncertain, rapidly changing, 
and potentially adversarial environments. 
This paper presented a combined fault-tree analysis (FTA) and failure mode and ef-
fects analysis (FMEA) model to identify, analyse, and evaluate the most critical failure 
modes and mechanisms in a drone prototype, which was developed in the laboratory to 
take aerial photography and video of onshore and offshore wind turbines. Both FTA and 
FMEA techniques have been commonly adopted and expanded into many engineering 
disciplines since the 1960s. However, to the best of our knowledge, this study was the first 
attempt to apply these methodologies to an unmanned aerial drone designed to collect 
inspection data from offshore wind farms. Four key subsystems of a drone system, namely 
communication, sensor, propulsion, and frame were included in our analysis. These sub-
systems were further broken down into their constituent components and parts such as 
flight controller, transmitter and receiver, motors, electronic speed control (ESC), propel-
lers, battery, camera, etc. Next, the failure modes and mechanisms associated with each 
drone component were identified from an extensive literature review followed by an ex-
pert’s panel assessment. Then, all root causes contributing to failure of the drone’s mission 
were determined and illustrated using an FTA approach. After that, three reliability fac-
tors of the occurrence of a failure (O), severity of the impact (S), and detectability (D) were 
given a rating of 1 to 10 by experts. Finally, the risk-priority-number (RPN) was calculated 
by multiplying these three factors and the failure modes were prioritized in descending 
order based on their RPN values. 
The RAM assessment of unmanned aerial drones is an important area requiring fur-
ther studies. In the following, we present some of the possible extensions to this work: 
(a) The availability of failure data for drones is often restricted because many operators 
keep such data confidential. Therefore, the FMEA assessments may be subject to in-
herent or epistemic uncertainty. To cope with such uncertainty, fuzzy set theory can 
be considered. 
(b) The relative importance among the three assessment criteria, i.e., O, S, and D was not 
taken into consideration. To gain a true understanding of the risk priorities, the rela-
tive importance of these must also be taken into consideration. 
(c) The proposed methodology in this paper, i.e., risk prioritization using the FTA and 
FMEA analysis, can be applied to other autonomous inspection systems such as re-
motely operated vehicles (ROVs) and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). 
We have worked on some of these extensions and the finding will be reported else-
where. 
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